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
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George Baxter Young

To Fellowstudents—

Let not the glory of those early days of gladness
Be dimmed o'er much by intervening mists of sadness,
Though now on toilsome tasks intent, awhile relax,
Permit "return of old sense movements on their
former tracks." *

*Professor Young's explanation of Memory.

THE ETHICS OF FREEDOM

By
GEORGE PAXTON YOUNG
M.A., LL.D.

NOTES

**Selected, Translated
and Arranged**

By His Pupil
JAMES GIBSON HUME
A.M., Ph.D.

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BY J. GIBSON HUME

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BIOGRAPHY.

The following from the pen of Rev. John Burton, B.A. appeared in "The Scot in British North America," Editor, W. J. Rattray, B.A., 1882.

"George Paxton Young, M.A., Professor of Logic, Metaphysics and Ethics in University College, Toronto, was born at Berwick-on-Tweed, on the 9th of November, 1818. After a preliminary training there, he was sent to the High School, Edinburgh, and thence to the University. Mr. Young was distinguished for his steady application, especially to his favourite subjects of mathematics and philosophy. After taking his degree, he was for some time engaged as a teacher of mathematics at Dollar Academy. When the disruption took place, Mr. Young, as might have been expected from his liberal views, espoused the cause of which the great Dr. Chalmers was the leading champion. Entering the Free Church Theological Hall, where he duly completed his course, he was ordained and placed in charge of the Martyrs' Church, Paisley. In the course of a few months, however, Mr. Young resolved to remove to Canada. He came hither in 1848, and at once accepted a call from Knox Church, Hamilton, Ont. After a pastorate of three years, he received the appoint-

ment of Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Knox College, Toronto. He was now in his element, and, not content with the ordinary work of lecturing, contributed a number of papers to the Canadian Journal on metaphysical subjects. It is said that one of these, which contained a partial elucidation of Sir William Hamilton's philosophical system, was warmly acknowledged by the great Scottish metaphysician.

After ten years' service in the Professorship, Mr. Young resigned both his position in the College and his ministerial office. The reason assigned by Mr. Young was, that deeper study had changed his doctrinal views to such an extent, that he could no longer conscientiously inculcate the theology of his church. His position was stated with the utmost candour, and he evidently possessed the courage of his opinions. To all appearance, Mr. Young, by taking this step, had deprived himself of a livelihood. Yet after an interval, he was employed by the Government as Inspector of Grammar Schools, a position he filled for four years with the greatest credit to himself, and singular advantage to the Province. During that time he fairly revolutionized the Grammar Schools, and succeeded in raising them to the degree of excellence they can now boast of under other names. His suggestions were embodied in several School Acts, with beneficial results. He was also a

member of the Central Committee on Education—a sort of advisory board attached to the department. When he resigned the Inspectorship, Professor Young was prevailed upon to return to Knox College. His abilities were too highly prized to be lost to the institution. Theology, in future, was to form no part of his teaching, and thus any impediment in his way was removed. In 1871, the Professor was appointed to the vacant chair of Metaphysics and Ethics in University College, a post he still occupies. As a teacher, Mr. Young stands deservedly high. His intellect is of a high order, his expositions even of abstruse problems, are unmistakeably plain and lucid; and he is a personal friend of all the students who attend his lectures. Two works have appeared from his pen, both on theological subjects. The first, published in 1854, contained "Miscellaneous Discourses and Expositions of Scripture," the second, which appeared in 1862, was an elaborate essay on "The Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion." Besides these, and the other contributions mentioned above, Professor Young has reprinted in pamphlet form at least one of his addresses. Mr. Young is singularly shy and retiring in disposition, and to that cause may, no doubt, be attributed the fact that he has never formally stated the doubts which have perplexed him. He is too sensitive not to shrink from unsettling the faith of others."

We might add that Professor Young continued to hold his position in the University of Toronto up to the time of his death. He died in harness. Suffering a paralytic stroke during one of his lectures he died a few days afterwards on February 26, 1889.

Dr. Young was greatly admired and respected by a wide circle of friends and acquaintances, by those who had the privilege of knowing him more intimately he was deeply beloved.

PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS.

With regard to the philosophical views of Professor Young, it would seem that at first he was drawn somewhat to the teaching of Sir William Hamilton.

To the last he was opposed to the views of David Hume though he did not endeavor to refute them later by the Philosophy of Common Sense, which he repudiated "root and branch" as he says in his lecture on Natural Religion. If one might hazard a conjecture regarding the change in his theological views about which he was so reticent, it would seem probable that with the explicit rejection of the philosophy of "Common Sense" he saw that many of the doctrines of the Presbyterian Church were moulded in the thought and phraseology of this philosophy and so he found that he could not teach what he regarded as erroneous. Apart from this philosophical setting, it would appear from his subsequent career and from the testimony of his pastors the late Rev. D. J. Macdonnell, D.D. and Rev. G. M. Milligan, D.D. that he retained the fundamental Christian beliefs though giving them a different philosophical interpretation.

Sir Daniel Wilson summarized the convictions of those who knew Dr. Young most intimately as follows:—

"That Dr. Young was a Christian in the best and highest sense of that term I have not the slightest doubt."

He gathered his new philosophical view-point from more extended and sympathetic study of Kant and was assisted by the writings of Dr. Edward Caird and by Professor John Watson's first book on "Kant and his English Critics."

As T. H. Green also based his views on the Kantian system of thought it is not so strange that Young and Green came to very similar results in Ethics. It was the conviction that Green had presented his own point of view so adequately that led Professor Young to give up the plan of writing out his own views on Ethics for publication. Two points of correspondence however are very striking.

First.—That the question of the Freedom of the Will is in both made to turn on the problem of the Motive.

Second.—That their view of the motive was practically identical.

Young's definition of Motive.:—

"A motive is constituted when an end definitely in the mind's view is thought of as desirable, that is as fitted to yield satisfaction to the choosing subject," and Green's definition in Bk. 2, Sec. 87, *Prolegomena to Ethics*;— "A motive again being an idea of an end which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realize."

In this little volume we are attempting to preserve some of Professor Young's lectures on the problems of Ethics.

The lecture on Freedom and Necessity was published in pamphlet form, April, 1870, and republished in the Knox College Monthly in August 1889.

The other notes are translated from Professor Young's shorthand notebooks. The notes on Kant and on Spencer are from notes taken in lectures.

Professor Young followed the method then in vogue in the Theological Colleges of giving an abstract of his lectures in numbered sentences. These were written on the blackboard or slowly dictated to the class. These were the bricks of the building; the mortar that bound them together consisted of explanatory remarks based on these as texts.

NOTE—Where single words are enclosed in brackets it is to indicate that the original shorthand character is ambiguous or undecipherable.

FREEDOM AND NECESSITY.

GENTLEMEN,

I purpose, in this Lecture, to inquire whether, and in what sense, men are free agents; and whether, and in what sense, their actions are necessary.

In discussing these questions, we shall be groping in the dark, unless we have perfectly clear conceptions of what action is. I observe, therefore, that, by voluntary action I mean an exertion of energy by an intelligent being, a subjective putting forth of effort, in the direction of an end which is in the mind's view. In this definition, which I give, not with the idea that any definition, which I give, can explain the nature of action, but simply to assist you to the exercise of that reflection through which alone the thing defined can be understood, the two essential points involved are, that voluntary action is a subjective determination, and that it is directed towards an end. Let us look at these a little more particularly.

In the first place, voluntary action is a subjective energy, issuing, no doubt, in certain objective results, but by no means to be confounded with these. For instance, I lift a glass of water, and raise it to my lips, and drink the water, in order to quench my thirst. As a number of

separate movements may here be distinguished, let us fix attention on the first—the stretching forth of the hand to the glass; and let us suppose that this is consciously done with a view to the quenching of thirst as the ultimate end to be attained. In such a case, the true action is not the outward movement, but the energy which is exerted by the being whom I call myself, and which results in the movement.

Of course, we describe the action by referring to the movement. We say: the hand is moved towards the glass. This mode of speaking is all that the ordinary purposes of life require. But, if we desire to investigate the matter philosophically, we must look beneath the surface of verbal expression, and not derive our views of what actions are, from the language in which they are customarily described. The movement of the hand is the purely mechanical effect of certain muscular contractions and expansions, produced through the application to the muscles of the stimulus of the nervous force, in precisely the same way in which the convulsion of the limbs of a dead frog follow a galvanic shock. Such movement, therefore, is not my action, properly so called, but only a result connected, and not even proximately connected, therewith.

This is the first point:—voluntary action is a subjective energy. The next is:—it is directed to a definite end in the mind's view.

To say that voluntary action is consciously directed towards an end, is the same thing as to say that it is done from motive; the presence of a desirable end to the mind being what constitutes motive.

There is a class of philosophers who carry out the doctrine of Association, and of Habit, as depending on Association, in such a manner as leads them to assert, that voluntary actions may be done without motive. Utilitarian moralists, for instance, like Mr. John Stuart Mill, who believe in the existence of disinterested affections, are obliged to take this ground. For, their theory of life is, that pleasure is the only motive by which human beings can be influenced. And yet they believe in disinterested affections. How do they reconcile these seemingly inconsistent principles? They attempt to do so, by showing that disinterested affections are generated, mainly through the influence of association, out of a primitive root of pure regard for Self; and that, when they have been thus generated, the voluntary actions, in which they manifest themselves, are done from habit, without motive. Mr. Mill, after remarking that "a person of confirmed virtue, or any other person whose purposes are fixed, carries out his purposes without any thought of the pleasure he has in contemplating them, or expects to receive from their fulfilment," adds: "this, however, is but an instance of that familiar fact, the power of habit, and is in no wise

confined to the case of virtuous actions. Many indifferent things, which men originally did from a motive of some sort, they continue to do from habit. Sometimes this is done unconsciously, the consciousness coming only after the action; at other times, with conscious volition, but volition which has become habitual, and is put in operation by the power of habit"—Now, I am not at present arguing against Utilitarianism, though the view, for which I am contending, is, I believe, fatal to the Utilitarian theory. I am concerned solely with the assertion, that, when a certain course of conduct has become habitual, actions may be done with conscious volition, and yet without motive. This I cannot admit. For, why is anything called a motive? Because, as it is in the view of the mind, it stimulates to action. Why do Utilitarians say that pleasure is a motive? Because pleasure is an end which men aim at in the actions which they perform. No other possible account of motive can be given, than that it is the end—the ultimate or true end—aimed at, which contemplated by the mind, stimulates to action. Well, then, if a good Samaritan, to whom the practice of benevolence has become habitual, aims at the relief of a suffering neighbour, without any thought of the pleasure that is to accrue to himself or without the thought of any thing, except benefiting the sufferer, is not the desire of attaining this end the motive of his action, in precisely

the same sense in which the desire of pleasure is the motive, where pleasure is the end sought? I do not deny that habit may lead to spontaneous action, where no end is consciously sought, and therefore no motive felt. I object to Mr. Mill's statements, only in so far as they relate to voluntary action. Habit renders voluntary action, in an accustomed course, easy. It does so, by strengthening the impulses towards the line of conduct to which we have habituated ourselves, and rendering weak the opposing influences. The practice of benevolence, for example, may have become so habitual, that the claims of Self may have practically ceased to make their voice heard in the presence of distress calling for relief. But this is not the annihilation of motive. It is merely the triumph of one motive over another; the *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, of a conqueror, who is scarcely, if at all, conscious of the resisting forces, which pass away before his disciplined and imperial sweep.

Having thus endeavoured to make clear the true conception of voluntary action, I am now prepared to indicate, what, in my opinion, philosophy is competent to teach regarding the free agency of man, on the one hand, and the necessity of human actions, on the other.—I have asserted that men possess a power of voluntary action. In this lies their freedom.—I have said also that voluntary action is performed under the influence of motives; and this, I be-

lieve, constitutes the sole necessity that governs human actions.—These two articles form the Thesis, which, in the remainder of the Lecture I am to develop and illustrate.

That men possess a power of voluntary acting, in the sense which has been described, is a proposition for the truth of which I can only appeal to consciousness. If I am conscious of any thing, I am conscious of being an agent;—not indeed of producing any outward results, but of putting forth energy, with which experience shows that such and such outward results are connected. I am conscious, at one moment, of listening to catch a sound; at another, of directing my eyes towards the countenance of a friend; again, of endeavouring to lift a weight; and, again, of resisting an impulse towards a particular gratification.

In saying that it is in the reality of this power of acting that freedom consists, I take a position different, in some measure, both from that of Edwards, and from that of Edwards' opponents. *They* hold that man's freedom is a Liberty of Indifference, in virtue of which, the mind, when solicited by a variety of motives, may choose any course, either this or that; *he*, that it is liberty to do as we will; a doctrine, which may, at first sight, appear to be much the same as the former, but nevertheless is quite distinct. Let us look at these theories a little more closely.

The so-called Liberty of Indifference is a supposed equilibrium of the Will, not indeed with respect to its inclination, but with respect to its power or ability to choose, in virtue of which, as I have said, when different motives present themselves, it can go either way. The ass, between the two bundles of hay, may be inclined towards the bundle on the right; or it may be inclined towards the bundle on the left; but, to which ever side the needle of inclination point, the Will, with respect to its power of choosing, remains in equilibrium, so that it can select either the one direction or the other.—Such doctrine, if the language in which it is expressed is to be taken with any degree of strictness, will not bear examination. For, the only ground on which the Liberty in question can be asserted, is the testimony of consciousness. If we are not conscious of a Liberty of Indifference, we can form no idea of what those mean, who contend for it. But we are not conscious of it. For, consciousness declares only what is. In regard to what may be, it is dumb.—I am conscious of freedom in everything that I do; in other words, I am conscious of being the real, and not the mere nominal, agent; but it is a contradiction in terms to speak of my being conscious of freedom, in regard to what is not being done, and never may be done.

Mr. J. S. Mill, after bringing forward, in opposition to the advocates of freedom, the argu-

ment which has just been stated, draws the conclusion, in a tone of considerable exultation, that the cause of freedom is lost. The appeal to consciousness, on which alone the assertion of freedom can be based, fails, because the circumstance which the witness is called to prove is one to which he cannot possibly depone. Mr. Mill's position here is impregnable, if the true conception of freedom be that which his argument assumes it to be. But I deny that this is the true conception of freedom. We are conscious of being free, not in respect of things which we are not doing and may never do, but in the actions which we perform. When we serve God, we serve him freely. When we commit sin, we sin freely. We are not forced to obey God. We are not forced to disobey God. We are conscious, when we obey, that we do it without constraint. We are conscious, when we disobey, that we do it without constraint. Consciousness, therefore, is a competent witness to human freedom, when the fact of freedom is rightly conceived; this fact being nothing more than the true and proper agency of the being whose freedom is asserted.

In reasoning against the dogma of Liberty of Indifference, I have taken the position, that we are conscious of *freedom in acting*, but not of *freedom to act* in one or other of a variety of ways in which we are not acting at the moment. But it may be said: do we not speak perpetually

of men being at liberty to adopt one or other of two courses that may be open to them? I answer; we do. The language is popular; it expresses briefly and intelligibly what is intended by those who use it; and to object to it, in ordinary discourse, would be mere pedantry. I am at liberty either to leave the platform on which I stand, or to remain in my present position. Undoubtedly, I am. But what is here asserted is something altogether different from the Liberty of Indifference on which I have been remarking. The meaning is:—I have learned, from past experience, that certain motions of my limbs are consequent on certain subjective energies; arguing, then, from the past to the future, I believe, that if I were at the present moment to put forth such and such energies, these would issue in movements of my limbs, in virtue of which I should step off the platform; while, if the requisite energies be not put forth, I shall remain where I am. But, though I am convinced that the one result or the other shall take place, according as certain subjective energies are or are not exerted, the conviction is not a datum of consciousness; it is an inference from experience, and one having nothing whatever to do with my free agency, properly so called, but only with the outward results which experience teaches us to connect with particular exertions of free agency.

In opposition to those who contend for an unthinkable Liberty of Indifference, Edwards rep-

resents our liberty as consisting in power to do as we will, or in (what he regards as being the same thing) the absence of hindrance to our doing as we will. How widely this is removed from the Liberty of Indifference, with which it might at first sight be confounded, will be apparent, when we attend to the meaning which Edwards attaches to the language he employs. By willing, he understands the choice or preference of the mind; and, by doing, the result arising upon our choice, according to the constitution of things, we know not how. The choice, he calls an act of Will; the result of the choice, a voluntary action; thus (most unhappily, in my opinion) distinguishing an act of Will from a voluntary action. But he admits that we are not conscious of the voluntary action; we are conscious only of the act of Will, and of an expectation, founded on experience, that the action will follow. "There is nothing," he says, "which I am conscious of while I walk, but only of my preferring or choosing, through successive moments, that there should be such alterations of my external sensations and motions, together with a concurring habitual expectation that it will be so; having ever found by experience, that on such an immediate preference such sensations do actually, instantaneously, and constantly arise." From this it is plain, that, when Edwards speaks of our being at liberty to do as we will, he does not mean that we are

at liberty to choose one or other of two alternatives, or at liberty to do any thing, in the sense of exerting any subjective energy; but what he means is this:—supposing our choice to have been made in a particular manner, if there is no hindrance in the way, to prevent our choice taking effect in those outward results which experience has taught us to connect with particular volitions, then, and in that regard, we are free. The example, by which he illustrates his doctrine, is: a bird, let loose, is at liberty to fly. Its cage being open, there is no hindrance to its flying.

I cannot but wonder at the laudations which this view of liberty has received from a host of eminent writers. In my opinion it has no merit whatever. On the contrary, by representing liberty as lying merely in the absence of hindrance to the effects of our actions, effects confessedly occurring beyond the sphere of consciousness, it tends to obscure and perplex the great truth, that there is a freedom of which we are conscious. No reasonings ever have been, or ever will be, able to drive out of men's minds the conviction that they are free, free not in the Edwardian sense, but with a liberty which belongs to their very nature as rational beings, and with which neither the presence nor the absence of hindrances to the motions of their limbs has anything to do. A man bound in chains is a free agent, as truly as if the fetters were removed.—He is not free,

you say, to cast off his chains. The bird is not at liberty to fly—I answer: what you mean by this, is, that no efforts which the man can put forth would result in breaking his chains. Granted. But what has that to do with the matter? You are merely asserting that certain external consequences would not follow from the man's actings. But the question of freedom, at least the only one worth discussing, is not, what consequences we are led by experience to believe would follow certain actions, but whether the subjective energies, which constitute our actions, are the unconstrained forth-puttings of a power inherent in Self; in other words, whether men are veritable, and not mere nominal agents.

It is on the miserable view of freedom, which considers it as having reference to the results of action, rather than as lying in the reality of the power of acting, that Locke, with whose statements, on this point, the remarks of Edwards very closely coincide, proceeds in determining how far human freedom reaches. How far human freedom reaches! Are we not free, if free at all, in every action we perform? But let us hear Locke. Liberty, he tells us, is "the power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other." And from this conception of liberty he draws the conclusion that we are free, as far as we can produce results, but no

farther. Thus, I am free to throw a quoit twenty yards, but not to throw it two hundred. Or, to give an illustration in Locke's own words: "a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For, though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling, yet, the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition, and therefore he is not free." It seems to me that the more correct account of such a case would be, that "herein" the man does not act at all, either freely or necessarily. The general statement, that liberty is the power which we have to do or to forbear any particular action, according to the preference of the mind, I could accept, if it meant no more than this, that we are free, in as much as we are veritable agents. But this is not Locke's meaning. He unambiguously uses the word action to denote not the subjective energy which the living being exerts, but the result in which that energy issues. Of course, if any one chooses to define action in this way, he can do so. And, if he chooses also to define freedom, so as to make it indicate merely the extent to which results follow our subjective exertions of energy, he can do so. But I repeat, that this is not the freedom of which we are conscious, since it is only from experience that we learn to connect certain results with our exertions of energy. And I say still farther, that

it is not the freedom which forms the basis of our responsibility. We feel ourselves, as true agents to be responsible for what we do:—for the energies which we direct towards certain ends; equally responsible whether the ends be attained or not.

With these remarks on the first Article of my Thesis, which places freedom in the possession of a veritable power of voluntary action, I proceed to the second, in which voluntary action is considered as prompted by motive.

A preliminary verbal explanation must here be made. We have seen that Edwards distinguishes voluntary action from act of Will; meaning by the latter, the act of the mind whereby we choose anything; and, by the former, the effect consequent upon our choice. On the view which I have taken of action, as a subjective energy, there is no distinction between act of Will, and voluntary action. An act of Will is a voluntary action; and there is no other kind of voluntary action. I act, by willing. I bend my arm—in so far as I, the living being, do any thing in the case—by willing to bend it. Hence, in speaking of motives, it is immaterial whether we say that they influence the Will, or that they prompt to action. The two statements are identical.

Can we, then, define the relation of motives to the Will, or to the conduct, more precisely than by simply saying, that motives influence the choice, or that men act from motives? I do not believe that we can. But, as you are

aware, philosophers of both the schools, whose views we have been examining, are of a contrary opinion. On the one hand, Edwards tells us, that the strongest motive determines the Will, according to a law of necessity. On the other hand, his opponents hold, that the mind by whatever motives it may be solicited, possesses a self-determining power. It is my task to show, as I hope to be able to do, that a criticism of these conflicting theories leads to the conclusion, that there is no truth held by the disputants on either side, which is not substantially held by both; the system of neither party containing any positive thinkable truth, over and above what I have mentioned, that men act from motives.

The principle of Edwards is, that the strongest motive determines the Will. But, whatever there may be in this doctrine, we may at all events simplify the formula, by striking out the word "strongest." For, what is meant by strongest motive? There is no conceivable test by which the relative strength of two contending motives can be estimated, except the actual result in which a struggle between them issues. A strain is brought to bear upon a cable. Which of the two forces is the stronger, the strain, or the tenacity of the rope? Wait, and you shall see. If the rope break; the former. If it do not break; the latter. So, (I suppose Edwards would say,) when two motives act upon the

Will, we can judge of their relative strength by the result. Good. Then, the stronger motive is, by definition, that which prevails. And hence the formula; the strongest motive determines the Will, is reducible to this: the motive which determines the Will, determines the Will;—a proposition in which the utmost amount of truth that can possibly be contained, is, that the Will is determined by motives.

The word “strongest” seemed to be somewhat but has turned out to be nothing. It has vanished; and the simplified formula remains in our hands: motives determine the Will.

Does this express any thing more than the fact, that voluntary action is performed from motive? To discover what more it expresses, if any thing, we must inquire what the determination spoken of is. It is explained to be a species of causal relation, in which motives stand to volition. In fact, the sole positive proof which Edwards gives for his doctrine, and therefore the sole means we have for ascertaining the precise import of that doctrine, is founded on the principle, that whatever comes to pass must have a cause. This, in substance, is also the one positive argument employed by Leibnitz, in his *Theodicee*, and in his correspondence with Clarke, in support of a conclusion similar to that of Edwards. We may safely assume, therefore, that it contains the whole gist of the matter.

Edwards explains that he employs the term cause " in a sense more extensive than that in which it is sometimes used." He defines it as "any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an Event, either a thing or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is a ground or reason, either in whole or in part, why it is rather than not, or why it is as it is rather than otherwise." It is plain, that, in this definition, several things, of entirely distinct sorts, are brought together under a common name. A cause is any antecedent, on which the result depends in any way. But there may be various antecedents, on which the result depends in various ways; and therefore our volitions may have different causes, to which they are in different ways due. For instance, the sustaining power of the Creator, exercised from moment to moment, is a ground or reason why our volitions are, rather than not; for, if this sustaining power were withdrawn, we should cease to exist. The Divine power is the efficient cause, to which our existence, as beings possessed of the power of Will, is to be ascribed. I need not say that it is not in this sense that motives are held by philosophers of the school of Edwards to be the causes of our volitions. Neither are they considered to be of the nature of physical causes. What then? They are regarded as moral causes; and the necessity, which is conceived to attach to their operation, is a moral necessity.

You will keep in mind, that we are trying to discover, how much, if any thing, is contained in the proposition: motives determine the Will, beyond what is involved in the statement, that voluntary action is performed from motive. The nut of the question lies in the word "determine;" and we have got thus far in our process of clearing up what that word implies: we have ascertained, namely, that the meaning intended to be conveyed, is, that motives are the moral causes of our volitions, and that the necessity which attaches to their operation is a moral necessity. But what do the expressions, moral causes, and moral necessity, mean? I do not know that any other answer can be given, than that they denote the relation which subsists between the nature of an intelligent agent, and the ends, which, in given circumstances, he prefers, or the actions, which, under given circumstances, he voluntarily performs. One person is tempted to steal a sum of money. He is a good man, and resists the temptation. Another is tempted to steal. He is a bad man, and gives way to the temptation. In general, the course which a person takes when certain ends, in any respect desirable, are present to his mind, will depend on the answer to the question: what sort of a person is he? With given motives brought to bear upon you, you, being such a person as you are, act as you do; whereas, if you had been a different sort of person, you would have acted differently.—This will

probably be accepted by the most thorough-going disciples of Edwards as a substantially correct statement of what is most essential in the doctrine maintained by that writer. And now observe what it amounts to. A man's actions, in given circumstances, depend, according to a law of moral causation, on his nature. What the man does, flows, by moral necessity, from what he is. But what conception can we form of our nature, except through the actings which exhibit it? We know what we are, only in knowing what we do. Actions are merely the evolution of nature,—nature unfolding itself. The doctrine of moral necessity, therefore, in so far as it pretends to go beyond the simple fact that men act from motives, is a mere truism. '*In presence of given desirable ends, a man must choose as he does.*' Of course, he must; for, to suppose his choice to be different from what it is, would be to suppose that he is a different man from what he is. '*His actions must have a moral cause; they must be according to his nature.*' Of course, they must; for we conceive nature as of this or that particular sort, only by conceiving the actions in which it develops itself. In admitting such statements and reasonings, we are manifestly admitting nothing, except that a man, being what he is, and being placed in the circumstances in which he is placed, acts with a view to the attainment of the ends, whose presence to the mind constitutes the motives by which, on the Ed-

wardian system, the Will is held to be determined.

We have seen, that, in the only true and intelligible sense in which motives can be said to determine the Will, the phrase expresses nothing more than that men act from motives. Let us now turn to the other side, and consider the position of those who contend for a self-determining power of the Will.

What is this self-determining power? Edwards finds himself unable to conceive that the Will can determine itself to any particular act, otherwise than by a previous act. Why do I will in such a manner? Because I will. And why do I will to will in this manner? Because I will. And why do I will to will to will in this manner? Because I will. And so on we go, down the bottomless inclined plane of an infinite series of volitions, as the condition of any volition whatever taking place. If this be what is meant by the self-determining power of the Will, Self-determination is manifestly impossible.

But the advocates of the self-determining power would certainly not admit that their position is correctly stated, when they are represented as conditioning each volition on a previous volition.

No doubt, they are accustomed to use such expressions, as, that we will in this or that manner because we choose. But it would be unjust to press their language too closely, and to compel it to yield the signification, that every volition

must be preceded by another. From their own expositions of their views, it may be gathered that the power of Self-determination, which they claim for the Will, is neither more nor less than that Liberty of Indifference, which (as we have seen) they ascribe to the Will. A man is solicited by two opposing motives; neither of these, prior to the man's choice, can be considered as essentially stronger than its competitor, so as necessarily to determine the choice that shall be made; but the man, while drawn to the right hand by the one motive, and to the left by the other, can choose either direction. In popular phrase, he can choose as he pleases; by which, however, is not meant that his choice is determined by a previous act of choice, but simply that he can choose either this or that. The question, therefore, whether the Will has a Self-determining power, is the same as the question, whether the Will has a Liberty of Indifference. Such Liberty I have already shown to be inconceivable. It is an unmeaning expression, unless it denote something of which we are conscious; but conscious of it we cannot possibly be, for consciousness does not tell us what we may or may not do, but only what we do. Other reasons for rejecting the doctrine of Liberty of Indifference might easily be urged;—the readers of Edwards will remember with what afflictive minuteness he treats the subject;—but the single brief argument, that has been advanced,

is, in my judgment, so unanswerable, that to add anything to it would (to borrow a simile of a late President of the United States) be wasting powder on dead ducks.

If we cannot admit a Self-determining power of the Will, in the sense that each volition is conditioned on a preceding volition, or in the sense that the will is endowed with a Liberty of Indifference, it will scarcely be alleged that there is any truth in the Self-determination theory, over and above this, that the mind, in its volitions, is under no constraint, but is itself the true and proper agent.

What is the conclusion of the whole matter? Edwards and his friends tell us that the strongest motive determines the will. Against this the objection lies, that the word "strongest" is at best a meaningless superfluity. But it is worse than superfluous, in as much as it tends naturally and almost irresistibly to convey the idea that the will is somehow forced. For, let the position be laid down, that, of two opposite motives, by which the mind is urged, there is something in the one, as compared with the other, which can intelligibly be called superiority of strength, prior to any action that the mind may take; then the mind seems to be reduced to the condition of a balance, with a heavy weight in one scale, and a light weight in the other; and freedom is destroyed; in other words, the mind has no power of acting left to it. The

word "strongest," therefore, must be thrown overboard. Thus simplified, the doctrine of Edwards is, that motives determine the will. On the other side, it is held that the will determines itself. Who is in the right? Both parties are right, or neither is, according as their respective formulæ are interpreted — '*The Will determines itself.*' True, if you mean that the mind, in its volitions, is under no constraint, but is itself the real and proper agent; but not true, or rather unintelligible, if you mean any thing else.— '*Motives determine the Will.*' True, if you mean that a man, walking (for instance) northward rather than southward, does it from some motive; but false or unintelligible, if you mean more.

It may perhaps be said, that, if the views, which I have advanced, are well founded, the controversy about man's free agency, and about the necessity that attaches to human actions, which has been so vehemently agitated, turns out to be a dispute about words. The whole thinkable truth on the question under discussion, is contained (it seems) in the two propositions, that men are agents, and that they act from motives; propositions not denied, either by Edwards, or by those against whom Edwards wrote. Have giants, then, been fighting for ages about nothing? I answer, that I believe the contending parties to have been substantially agreed on the great facts of the case; yet

the contest between them was not altogether about words. The arguments, on both sides, were directed largely, and, in this respect, to good purpose, against unreal conceptions, which had been associated with the reality held by both parties in common. Wishing to extend their knowledge beyond the facts which exist to be known, and by this means to provide a support for convictions that could have stood well enough on their own behalf, the philosophers, whom I have been venturing to criticize, evoked Chimæras from the abyss of inconceivability, and thrust these forward in front of the simple truth, as its main stay and hope; here, the Chimæra of Strongest Motives; there, the Chimæra of Liberty of Indifference; phantoms, which were regarded, the one by the combatants on the one side, and the other by the combatants on the other, as inconsistent with the very life of the truth they had been summoned to defend; and which certainly, as only darkening and defacing the truth by the smoke which they threw around it, behooved by all means to be driven from the field.

Throughout the whole of this Lecture, it has been assumed that the mental manifestations, of which we are conscious, are not the mere products of corporeal organization, but that, united with the body, there is in man an immaterial principle, the subject of thought and feeling, and the agent in volition. Were this

denied, freedom, of course could no longer be maintained; for the phenomena of mind would be reduced to the rank of a special class of material phenomena;—a very special and distinguished class, no doubt, but still subject to the same general law with the lower phenomena of matter, and therefore necessary, in exactly the same manner in which the falling of a stone to the earth under the earth's attraction is necessary. Accordingly, those physiological psychologists, who either deny, or fail to recognize, the existence of an immaterial principle in man, are, with one consent, necessitarians, in a sense of the word necessity, in which necessity and freedom are incompatible with one another. We have an example of this in Professor Bain of Aberdeen. That writer's view of the Will is as follows. It has two fundamental constituent elements. The first is, the existence of a spontaneous tendency—the response of the system to nutrition—for movement to take place, independently of the stimulus of feeling: The second is, the law that connects pleasure with increased vitality, and pain with diminished vitality. The manner in which these laws combine to produce Will, the following quotation will explain: "We suppose movements spontaneously begun, and accidentally causing pleasure; we then assume, that, with the pleasure, there will be an increase of vital energy, in which increase the fortunate movements will share, and thereby increase the

pleasure Or, on the other hand, we suppose the spontaneous movements to give pain; and assume, that, with the pain, there will be a decrease of energy, extending to the movements that cause the evil, and thereby providing a remedy. A few repetitions of the fortuitous concurrence of pleasure and a certain movement will tend to the forging of an acquired connection, under the law of Retentiveness or Contiguity, so that, at a future time, the idea shall evoke the proper movement at once," You will observe, that in this theory of the origin of voluntary power, there is an entire ignoring of any thing that can properly be called the exertion of energy by the mind. All the stages through which Professor Bain conducts us, are such as might be laid down by one who did not believe that there is an immaterial principle in man, but who held that all the varieties of mental manifestation are merely the product of organization. Nutrition is received into the system. Nervous currents begin to flow. Movements follow. A movement accidentally leads to pleasure; this heightens the general vitality; and the fortunate movement shares in the increased vitality. Or, a movement leads to pain; this lessens the general vitality; and the unfortunate movement shares in the diminution of vitality. Association comes in, and plays its part in strengthening the bonds between pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and certain movements on the other;

and the result is, that, ultimately, pleasure and pain, whether in fact or in idea, have a definite "volitional effect," in the way of tending to produce movements.—Into an examination of systems of this class, which contradict, as I believe, the most fundamental facts of human nature, I have not entered; but I have limited myself to what has proved a sufficiently extensive field for a single lecture, an examination of the ground that must be taken, on the question of human freedom and of the necessity of human actions, by those who admit that there is a personal intelligent agent, distinct from the nervous forces, that flow in response to nutrition, and set the limbs in motion.

PHASES OF THE WILL.

RESOLUTION.

1. Resolution "A phase of our voluntary actions." Bain 417. To resolve is to will to act in a certain manner.

2. What is the phase of our voluntary actions which the term "Resolution" properly expresses? In is an act of volition having reference to something to be done hereafter. I resolve, e.g., to go to Hamilton to-morrow.

3. Look at it more particularly. Usually there has been a preceding process of deliberation longer or shorter. The deliberative process has now come to an end, and the self-consciousness subject thinks that the most desirable thing will be to take some definite course of action, not immediately indeed but at a future time. I resolve to amend my life next year. Thus resolution, in the proper sense of the term, looks to the future.

4. Of course you might say that a man may resolve to turn a new leaf at once. In that case I think the more proper way of expressing the fact would be to say that he turns the new leaf. He might turn it now—or—he might resolve. This seems the true import of the word "resolve" he might resolve to turn it next year.

DR. BAIN'S THEORY.

(BAIN. THE EMOTIONS AND THE WILL, THIRD EDITION.)

1. He calls resolution "A phase of voluntary actions" Correct.

2. He recognizes resolution as ensuing on a previous state of deliberation. (Correct). "A preliminary volition."

3. So far I am at one with Dr. Bain. At the next step of his exposition, he and I part company. When resolution ensues on a previous state of deliberation, what, according to Dr. Bain takes place? During deliberation, contending pleasures and pains were engaged in a tug of war, Buffalo *vs.* Toronto, but as yet Buffalo has not dragged Toronto over the line. Here existed, to use Dr. Bain's own language "A precisely adjusted equivalence of motive forces." But now—ah! Buffalo wins, Toronto is dragged over the line, the man resolves—to take some definite step, say, to-morrow. He does this by what Dr. Bain felicitously calls a "preliminary volition." Yes, the resolution is a volition preliminary to some others. But—when we are told that this preliminary volition is nothing else than the success of one set of motive forces; one set of pleasures and pains; over something entering in a tug of war, I, of course reject the doctrine in toto. The doctrine is indeed so opposed to what appears to be evident truth, that I am almost afraid you will think that I am burlesquing Dr. Bain's doctrine. I can

only implore you to read Dr. Bain's exposition for yourselves.

What might be called "permanent resolution," p. 418.

In order that a resolution may be "permanent" it must have some permanent ground or cause, p. 419. "It is impossible that a volition requiring protracted labor can be sustained by the prompting of a temporary cause."

In regard to matters of duty, there is nothing more fatal than the habit of resolving to do to-morrow or at some future time what as thought should be done now. I resolve that I will begin to lead a good course of life, after I have had some enjoyment of the world. Hell is paved with good resolutions of this kind "Resolves and Re-Resolves and does the same."

DELIBERATION.

1. A voluntary act. Of what nature precisely?
2. Certain ends are before the mind's view.

The rational subject is unable at the moment to come to a decision as to which is the most desirable.

Therefore he does not make any one of them the object of his preference. This however is putting the case only negatively. He does *not* make any one of them the object of his preference. But this does not imply an absence of volition, on the contrary, he voluntarily chooses to con-

sider the matter more fully before deciding which of the ends in question he will elect, or whether he should elect any one of them.

DR. BAIN'S THEORY.

1. "A voluntary act—under a concurrence or complication of motive forces." p. 408.

2. The motive forces are pleasures and pains (Theory will be more fully stated (note 2)).

Note—"A pleasure may be opposed to a pain with such a precisely adjusted equivalence, that we remain at rest," p. 408.

3. But this is the most essential point in the theory. How comes it that we remain at rest? This is the result of the thought of the evil consequences that may ensue on too hastily deciding in a particular manner. Such a thought is a new impulse; which operates in the way of restraining the impulses that tend to induce immediate action, some in one direction, others in an opposite direction.

4. That the mental attitude here described is really of the nature of volition will be apparent. Dr. Bain points out that volition is action controlled by feelings: the thought of the undesirableness of too hastily taking either this course or that is a feeling,——— a painful feeling tending to restrain action, just as the idea of the pain that would be suffered by putting your finger in the flame of a candle restrains you from doing that foolish and hurtful act.

"Knowing all this," from our own experience, "we come to see that it is dangerous to carry into effect the result of the first combat of opposing forces; and this apprehension of evil consequences is a stimulant of the will like any other pain." p. 408.

REMARKS.

This theory of deliberation is exactly what we would expect from a writer holding Dr. Bain's general views on the will. I make the following remarks on it.

1. Dr. Bain's statement assumes that pleasures and pains are the only motives by which a rational being can be influenced. I do not accept this. "Two great classes of stimulants," p. 411.

2. A more important point, as regards the subject in hand, is, that the state of deliberation is supposed to arise from a concurrence of motive forces so *equally* balanced that one is not strong enough to carry the day against the others. Dr. Bain's words are "A pleasure may be opposed to a pain with such a precisely adjusted equivalence that we remain at rest," p. 408. This is most misleading. Motives [identified with pleasant and painful states of feeling] are represented as forces drawing the man to the choice of this or the choice of that, forces operating apart from the acts of choice,——— and tending to determine it without any action on the part of the self-conscious subject—without any action in any sense of the (word) except the

organic action in which feeling may issue. I reject this doctrine. No motive, properly so called, exists, except as implicated in the volition to which it is a motive. To represent volition as the result of a tug of war between pleasures and pains, the former dragging the arm up, the latter dragging it down, is simply to misrepresent volition.

3. The force of this objection to Dr. Bain's theory of deliberation is not removed by what he says about the thought of the evil consequences of too hastily yielding to a particular impulse. This thought he tells us, is a stimulant to the will like any other pain, and it is the stimulant which in the case of deliberation carries the day. But the thought of the evil consequences of too hastily deciding is not a stimulant to the will like any other pain. It is not a pain. It is not a feeling at all. It is a thought essentially—assume it as Dr. Bain would say, “to carry the day,”—a volition.

While I thus reject Dr. Bain's theory of deliberation, his exposition contains very excellent remarks, which both for your own sakes and with a view to your examinations you would do well to consider. Let me notice two points.

A. The first is what he says about the danger of carrying deliberation too far. “The evil of a too quick decision being only a probable and imagined evil, there is room,” (here is the kernel to the sentence) “for the perturbation

of terror with its exaggerated influence upon the thoughts, and through them, upon the will, and the postponement of action may be carried to an absurd length. It is one of the properties of a well-trained intellect, to make at once a decisive estimate of time and thought to be allowed for the influx of consideration on both sides of the case; and at the end of such reasonable time and thought, to give way to the side that then appears the stronger," p. 409. This is admirable, only it is impossible to avoid observing that the self-conscious subject, who alone can properly "give way" to the side which appears ("to him") the stronger, is completely ignored.

B. The second point to which I referred is the advantage incidental to deliberation, namely that "by keeping a conflict suspended new motives may successfully come into view," p. 411. Of course we have here the theory that runs through Dr. Bain's entire exposition, of deliberation being simply "A conflict of motive forces." But making allowance for that, the point brought forward is an important one. It is of great consequence to note, the tendency to which ordinary minds are (prone), of allowing the last solicitation that reaches the mind, a weight to which it is (relatively) not entitled. (Read Dr. Bain.)

Dr. Bain describes in this connection Franklin's "moral algebra," p. 413, suggesting

an improvement of it. The so-called Moral Algebra of Mr. Franklin and Dr. Bain's improvement of Franklin's (method) are alike, in my opinion, useless. You can read and judge for yourselves.

ATTENTION.

1. What? The exercise of will by which the thoughts are directed towards a particular object.

The will can control the thoughts. We shall afterwards ask: how?

2. Experiential theory. Mill's Analysis of the Human Mind, Vol. II, p. 362.

To what do we attend? Sensations and ideas, p. 363.

Sensations A. "The pleasurable or painful sensation . . . engrosses the mind."

"But this really means no more than that it a pleasurable or painful sensation," p. 363.

—"Engrossing the mind,"—equals "Attention," p. 363.

Attention—and—having a pleasant or painful sensation are not really distinguishable, p. 364.

"A". Attending to indifferent sensations; (Indifferent—"not an object of attention on its own account," p. 367. Object of attention?—This can only mean not pleasant or painful.)

—It may be rendered interesting through association, (*i.e.*, "As the cause or sign of an interesting sensation, p. 367.)

—"The having a sensation rendered interesting by association" and "the attending to it" cannot be regarded as two different things, p. 367.

"B". Ideas, like sensations, interesting or not interesting.

(a) An indifferent idea not an object of attention.

(b) "Attention is but another name for the interesting character of the idea," p. 368.

(c) "An indifferent idea may become interesting through association," p. 369, *i.e.*, what is uninteresting becomes associated with what is interesting. The whole compound is interesting, p. 369. Conclusion. Attending to an interesting idea is merely having it.

Objections: I will to retain the idea. This is not merely having the idea. It is an action of the self-conscious subject with reference to the idea supposed to be already in the mind.

Calderwood's Account of the manner in which through attention, an impulse gains strength, so as, at its maximum to determine action (which it can only do by determining volition.)

Even if it be conceded that previous volitions of (mine) have contributed to make the impulse what it is, yet, if the impulse being what it is determine my volition, as an antecedent necessarily causing an effect, the will cannot with any propriety be said to be self-determined. It is, on the theory in question, which is Dr. Calderwood's, determined by something foreign to it-

self: Something which by its previous acts, the Will contributed to bring about; still, by something which is foreign to itself. It is therefore not self-determined.

EFFORT.

1. What is called "The sense of effort" is regarded by some writers as implying that we are conscious of a causal connection between our volitions and the organic effect produced in overcoming obstacle.

2. Hume, Hamilton and others have conclusively shown that there can be no such consciousness.

3. What the phrase "Sense of effort" properly denotes is a certain state of feeling, partly feeling of resistance, (partly) feeling of expended energy.

4. Dr. Bain identifies the sense of effort with the feeling of expended energy, which is equivalent to a feeling of greater or less, exhaustion. There appears to be no reason for neglecting to take into account the feeling of resistance which we experience as the obstacle is being gradually overcome.

5. If the sense of effort be described as a certain sort of feeling this must not be so taken as to ignore the action of the self-conscious subject in the putting forth of the effort.

6. I am said to put forth an effort when I exercise the volition necessary to overcome an obstacle, and as a result of this experience a

feeling of resistance as the obstacle is being overcome, and along with this a feeling of expended energy due to the effect which I have produced.

7. In Dr. Bain's exposition, the will as an action of the self-conscious subject is entirely neglected. This is in accordance with the principles of his philosophy, but the error is a very serious one.

DESIRE.

The subject of desire will be fully considered afterwards in the lectures on Green. At present the following brief notes may suffice.

1. The word "Desire" is ambiguous. It may denote merely an animal feeling, with the impulse to organic movement, or it may be used so as to imply an action of the self-conscious subject desiring.

2. By an action of self-consciousness on feeling, the feeling is radically changed. It remains however feeling still. If the term "Desire" be used to denote simply a feeling, even though modified through the action of self-consciousness, desire is not a phase of volition.

3. But if, when desire is spoken of, the term includes the action of the self-conscious subject desiring an action, in which he takes the end desired as, for the time, his good, then desire is a phase of volition.

4. What is commonly called the state of desire is one in which the object desired cannot be immediately attained, and in which therefore uneasiness occasioned by the want of an imagined good is experienced.

5. The state of desire is a state of feeling more or less painful. It is this that Locke has in view when he identifies desire with uneasiness.

6. If the indentification of the state of desire with a mode of uneasy feeling be admitted, the admission must not be understood to imply, that, when a man desires an object in the sense of consciously making it for the time his good; he is merely experiencing a feeling. Desire in such a case is essentially volition.

7. Desire, considered as uneasy feeling is assumed by Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann to be the ground form of volition, and, on this view they construct what has been called the "Metaphysical Argument" for their Pessimism. Will is the ultimate reality in the Universe. The ground form of conscious volition is desire. Desire is uneasiness, therefore a life of consciousness is of necessity one of misery.

8. Apart from other objections to such reasoning, the identification of volition with desire, in the sense in which desire is a painful state of feeling is inadmissible.

DESIRE.

DR. BAIN'S ACCOUNT.

The analysis of the state of desire brings to light three particulars:

1st. The state implies want or deficiency.

2nd. Through the presence to the mind of a definite object which is fitted to meet the want felt (and in that respect regarded as desirable) a motive to action comes into play.

3rd. There is a bar in the way of acting. It is of course in view of this last point that (psychologists) are in the habit of teaching that the state of desire is to some extent painful. Dr. Bain states this moderately when he says that the bar in the way of acting "renders desire a more or less painful form of mind."

I need not point out my objections to this treatment of the question of desire.

(a) First it may be admitted that the term "Desire" may with propriety be used to express an uneasy state of the mind arising from an imagined good, which we are hindered by some bar from immediately attaining.

(b) But it is an error to represent the idea of this absent good as constituting a motive to action in the proper sense of the term. An impulse arises therefrom but animal impulse is not motive.

(c) Third and principally, Dr. Bain's exposition of Desire ignores any action of the self-

conscious subject in desiring an end which for the time he makes his good. He would grant that a man desires fame. The true account of such desire is that the rational subject makes fame for the time his good. There is no place in Dr. Bain's philosophy for any such statement.

CONTROL EXERTED BY THE WILL.

Control of the Will over the Feelings.

1. By direct action on the muscles.

(By influence on the course of the thoughts.)

In this way we can to a certain extent check those organic movements which constitute the expression of a feeling, *e.g.*, the trembling of the limbs under the emotion of fear.

THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF LIFE.

1. The Utilitarian theory of life must be rejected as involving a denial of disinterested action.

2. Some Utilitarians like Mr. J. S. Mill admit disinterestedness and they endeavor in various ways to reconcile this with the theory of life which they hold; but as has been shown in the detailed examination of Mr. Mill's views, the attempt is a failure. In Dr. Bain's words, the disinterestedness evaporates in the analysis.

3. It is undeniable, that, even where action is disinterested, some satisfaction of one's own nature is sought, and, if the Utilitarian theory of life meant simply this, it might be accepted. To say that a rational being desires anything in the sense of making it his good, is just another mode of saying that he seeks that good as satisfying to his nature. But, while this has been granted, the whole question in dispute between Utilitarians and their opponents has still to be settled; viz., whether pleasure or agreeable feeling is the sole thing with which rational beings seek to satisfy themselves. To answer this question in the affirmative is a misrepresentation of the nature of rational beings.

4. It may be said: if Pleasure be not the only good for man, what then is his good?

5. This can be answered only partially. The true good or Summum Bonum of a rational being becomes apparent only as his nature rises to fuller and fuller development. But the question though admitting only of a partial answer, can be answered sufficiently for the purpose in hand. We can point to many things distinct from pleasure, in which men of ordinary moral character seek satisfaction, and in which as a matter of fact, they find more satisfaction than any amount of pleasure could give. For instance, the pursuit of knowledge, self-sacrifice for the good of others, and the habitual, constant performance of what a man regards as his duty.

6. Take the pursuit of knowledge. The Utilitarian asks, would a man pursue knowledge if it did not give him pleasure? The reply is: a man would certainly not pursue knowledge if it did not meet some want of his rational nature.

But this is an entirely different thing from saying that knowledge would not be pursued if it did not yield pleasure. To identify these two statements, would be to assume what cannot be conceded, that pleasure is the form of satisfaction sought in the pursuit of knowledge.

7. But it is argued, the acquiring of knowledge gives a man pleasure. A glow of agreeable feeling is experienced as new truths unfold themselves. Granted. But, because agreeable feeling *results* from the attainment of an object of desire, it

does not follow, that this agreeable feeling was the thing desired.

8. If a man did not possess a nature in virtue of which knowledge is loved by him for itself alone, and without any reference to the pleasure to be found in the attainment of knowledge, the attainment would not yield him pleasure.

9. In like manner, if the good Samaritan had not been a man of such a character as to love his neighbor disinterestedly, he would have felt no pleasure in seeing the good he was able to do to his neighbor.

10. Even where pleasure is the form of satisfaction sought, the desire, in its distinctively human form is not for agreeable feeling (*simpliciter*), but for some object which the self-conscious subject presents to himself as fitted to give him satisfaction. The recognition of this, were there nothing else to be said, would be essentially the overthrow of the Utilitarian theory of life.

11. Utilitarians say that the object is desired for the sake of the pleasure, and they consider this to be equivalent to saying that pleasure is at bottom the sole thing desired. This however, is a mistake. The desire of pleasure, apart from the thought of objects to afford satisfaction can be nothing else than the animal impulse lying in feeling. This is a totally different thing from the rational motive that arises when an object

is presented by the self-conscious subject to himself as fitted to meet a felt want.

12. The point to which attention is here called may be otherwise presented by saying that instead of pleasure being the sole motive to action, it is, merely as pleasure, not a motive at all. Motive supervenes *on* pleasure, only when the self-conscious subject presents to itself an object by the attainment of which an imagined pleasure may be realized. In the proper sense of the term, motive, there can be no motive except to some course of action definitely thought, but no definite course of action, by which (pleasure) may be attained can be before the mind, except on condition that an object be thought through the attainment of which the pleasure imagined, may become actual.

(Here some notes used in writing the above).

5. —

No doubt it might be held that an action is (right) when its motive is the desire to produce the greatest amount of pleasure to rational or sentient beings. But in the first place, this is not what Utilitarians are in the habit of saying.

Their doctrine is that the rightness of an action does not depend on the motive. In Mr. J. S. Mill's words; to save a man from drowning is an action equally right, whether the motive be benevolence, or a desire to be paid for one's trouble.

6. In the second place, the view that the rightness of an action is independent of the motive is the only one which Utilitarians can consistently take; for with them, the motive to action, whatever form it may assume, is always essentially the same, namely the desire of pleasure.

THE UTILITARIAN DOCTRINE OF THE ETHICAL STANDARD.

1. The Utilitarian doctrine of the ethical standard necessarily falls with the Utilitarian theory of life. If other things than pleasure be desirable, then the moral ideal or end of life cannot be simply the (product) of pleasure, whether to the individual agent or to mankind generally.

2. Even if the overthrow of the theory of life adopted by Utilitarians did not involve the rejection of what they teach regarding the ethical standard, it would be impossible logically to pass from the former doctrine to the latter, that is, unless a purely egoistic Utilitarianism be held.

3. In setting up as a standard of right the tendency of action to produce pleasure, Utilitarians make the moral character of an action depend on something external to the action, whereas the action, if it can with propriety be said to have moral quality at all, must have it intrinsically, in virtue of its being the action which it is.

3. When Utilitarians speak of the moral quality of an action, and tell us that it is determined by the tendency of actions to promote pleasures, they have reference to external actions in abstraction from the motive that led to its performance, but an external action, as so considered, has no moral quality whatever.

4. Here two questions may perhaps be asked: Is it really just the case that the external actions, in abstraction from motive is that to which Utilitarians attach moral quality? And next, if Utilitarians do this, is it necessary on Utilitarian principles that such a view should be taken?

5. As to the first question, let Mr. J. S. Mill answer. He says *Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol. III, p. 325 "Utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow-creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble."

6. Mr. J. S. Mill, therefore; and those Utilitarians of whom he may stand as a representative, attach moral quality to the external action in abstraction from the motive that led to it.

7. But now as to the second question, namely whether Utilitarian principles require such a position to be taken. May we not suppose a Utilitarian to hold that what is really right is not the external action which produces a maximum of pleasure, but the volition directed whether mediately or immediately toward that end?

8. The reply is, that, to take this ground would be essentially a giving up of Utilitarianism in the ordinary sense altogether. The most fundamental principle of the system is that the motive to action however it may be

disguised, is always the same, namely pleasure. There can be no difference among actions so far as their motive is concerned; and therefore if some actions are right and others wrong, the ground of this distinction has to be sought elsewhere than in the motive. But where motive is left out of account, nothing is left to give one action a claim to moral approbation more than another except organic movement with its results. This doctrine cannot be accepted. The movement of a bodily organ, apart from the action of a personality on whose volition the movement was consequent, can be neither right nor wrong.

9. It may be said: admitting that nothing can be right or wrong except the volition of a person or self-conscious subject, may not the *circumstances* in virtue of which certain feelings are right be that they have for their end the production of a maximum of pleasure to sentient beings? If this could be maintained would (it) not be Utilitarianism of a certain type?

10. It would certainly not be Utilitarianism of the ordinary type. Volition cannot be separated from motive. It is the motive that makes a volition what it is. Indeed, a volition and its motive are essentially one. Therefore the doctrine indicated if called Utilitarianism, is at any rate an abandonment of the theory of life which reduces all motive to pleasure. If motive be constituted by the end, consciously in view, which the agent, makes for the time his good,

then to find the basis of moral distinctions in the ends aimed at, would be to find the basis of moral distinctions in the motives to volition, which, if moral distinctions have any reality, implies an intrinsic difference in motives.

11. Suppose then that the ordinary Utilitarian theory of life is abandoned, and that an intrinsic difference in motives is admitted, in other words, that there are other things desirable besides pleasure, many things much more desirable than pleasure, would it be wrong to say that the rightness of an action depends on its tendency to promote the highest good of mankind? If this ground could be taken, would not Utilitarianism properly understood, be the ethical standard after all?

12. To this the only reply that can be given is, that man's chief good is the realization of the moral ideal, what this ideal is can be known only in so far as the moral nature has unfolded itself and thus exhibited the capabilities that are in it, therefore it can be known only partially and imperfectly. At the same time there is (apparently) no generalization, in which the rules of conduct that would be observed in particular circumstances are better gathered into a single expression than that which declares it right to seek the general good. The good, of course, is not to be confounded with the pleasant, what the *essential* good is, it may be hoped that man will learn to understand better and better as the world progresses.

CONSCIENCE.

1. Conscience in a man is Reason, revealing to him moral law for the guidance of his conduct.

2. In order that this definition may not be misunderstood, it may be kept in view, that Reason may have different degrees of development. This is tantamount to saying that Conscience may be more or less enlightened.

3. Hence the view that Conscience furnishes an immediate unerring assurance of the validity of certain moral principles unconditionally and without exception valid, cannot be maintained.

4. How then more exactly may the function of Conscience be expressed? The Reason is the source of the ideas of right and wrong. It is the source of these ideas however not in a purely abstract form, but in connection with particular courses of conduct, which are thought as right or wrong. In the thought of particular courses of conduct as right or wrong, a rule for action is provided, though the rule may not be (absolutely proved.) Conscience in a man is simply Reason (considered) as providing such a rule, according to the degree of the *development* of Reason as it may be more or less in agreement with the absolutely desirable or morally good.

5. It may be said; is not this to represent Reason, as self-contradictory? If conscience in one man, or the reason as developed in him, pronounces a certain course of conduct to be

right, while conscience in another man, or the reason as developed in him, pronounces the same course of conduct to be wrong, is not Reason at variance with itself?

6. No, unless development be self-contradictory.

7. Reason would be made self-contradictory, in irreconcilable variance with itself, if it were held that it immediately discovered moral principles unconditionally and without exception valid and if it were also proved that some of these principles are inconsistent with others. But there is no contradiction in saying that Reason, while not revealing to any man moral principles unconditionally and without exception valid, does reveal to all men, in whom its light has begun to shine, the existence of a better and a worse, in other words, the fact of Moral Law, though what the law in a particular case is, may not be so clearly apprehended by one man as by another. It may not be apprehended with equal clearness by the same man at different times.

8. It may still be argued, that, though development of Reason, may not show its self-contradictoriness, the view that Conscience admits of being more or less enlightened leaves duty ultimately uncertain. If my Conscience is not absolutely unerring, how can it be a guide to me at all?

9. The first thing to be said in reply to such a question is, that, whatever difficulty may be

supposed to attach itself to the doctrine that Conscience is not infallible, the fact does not admit of being gainsaid. It is simply indubitable, that men differ not only as Dr. Calderwood admits, in their moral judgment, but also, what Dr. Calderwood, does not admit, in the principles on which their moral judgment proceeds.

10. The next thing to be said is, that, taking it as incontrovertible that a man's conscience may become more enlightened at one time than it was at another, it does not follow that Conscience is without value as a guide. The path of duty may not be seen with absolute clearness, but this does not imply that it is not seen at all.

11. Admitting that I find in my Reason the idea of a better and a worse, that is, the idea of a law which I should obey, with intimations however imperfect as to what the law is, reflection may render these intimations more definite, and may deepen my conviction that certain general principles of action are in the direction of that absolute fulfilment of myself to which my rational nature prompts me to aspire. In such circumstances, though I cannot claim that every principle of action which seems to me, at the stage of my development which I have reached, to be valid, is absolutely and unconditionally so, yet I surely cannot be said to be left without particular guidance.

12. The true conclusion to be drawn from the fact that conscience admits of being educated

and of becoming more enlightened, is, not that we are without a rule for conduct, but that a man should never allow himself to remain so fixed in the particular convictions to which he may have been brought, as to be insensible to the influences that may be at work, fitted to raise him to a higher moral condition.

13. According to the view given, Conscience cannot be considered as a principle of action, co-ordinate with the particular impulses in man. Each of these latter principles impels along a line of action of its own, towards its own appropriate end. The moral faculty has no special line or end of its own. Its business is to indicate that *some* end, of those that may be aimed at, is preferable to others, and that we are under obligation, under moral necessity, to seek it. It is thus, not an impulsive, but a directive principle.

14. This throws light on what has always been felt to be the distinguishing characteristic of the moral faculty: its authority. Had the moral faculty been a special impulse, co-ordinate, *e.g.*, with the love of pleasure, or the love of knowledge, it would have been difficult to comprehend what superiority it could possess over the others. Special impulses exist, in virtue of special ends, which being in the mind's view, prompt to (action.) Now various promptings to act may be more or less powerful, more or less (efficacious), but it is not easy to understand in what sense one

prompting as compared with another, can be authoritative. But the moral faculty does not supply a prompting additional to those of the other special ends, which may be before the mind. It merely pronounces that the highest of the ends that may be before the mind, should be sought; and this declaration is *ipso facto* one of absolute authority.

In pronouncing that the highest end should be sought, what is the Reason doing but declaring that we are under law? That it is imperative, obligatory, morally necessary, that we choose this end? That, even should our inclination to some lower ends be very powerful, we ought not to give way to such inclinations, and that if we do give way to it, we shall be doing wrong? In other words, the moral faculty, even if not sovereign "*de facto*" is conceived as sovereign "*de jure*," its sole function being to act as sovereign, to guide, command, prescribe. If it has not authority it is nothing. A *nominis umbra*. It is either authoritative, or there is no such faculty in man.

DR. CALDERWOOD'S FIRST PRINCIPLES

"HANDBOOK OF ETHICS."

1. Dr. Calderwood appears to think that the various first principles of morals: Honesty is right, Purity is right; and so on, can be brought under one supreme principle, "it is right to use our powers for rational ends." (In the earlier editions of his "Handbook" it was "For their natural ends") The two phrases apparently are regarded by him as amounting to the same thing.

2. He illustrates this by selecting the principle "Honesty is right."

3. This principle he brings under the supreme principle in the following manner—

(a) Our powers should be used for the ends which reason prescribes — equals — for natural ends.

(b) So far as the acquisition of property is concerned our powers are used rationally, or for their natural ends, when employed in production.

(c) Through production arises the right of property.

(b) And the law of Honesty requires that a title to property thus acquired directly or indirectly should be respected.

4. Here we have the duty of Honesty deduced from what is regarded as the supreme principle

of morals by the aid of a certain view as to the origin of property.

5. Dr. Calderwood's theory as to the origin of property cannot be maintained. Property is a convention of men in society, made for the most part with a more or less enlightened regard to the general good.

6. That property does not originate in the manner assumed by Dr. Calderwood, is evident from this, that rights of property are universally recognized in many cases, where there has been no production.

7. Still further, where there has been production, the producer is never held to have any absolute property in what he has produced. Such proprietary (rights) as would be conceded to him under ordinary circumstances, are, according to the practice of all civilized communities, made to give way to the general good.

8. Dr. Calderwood's "Supreme Principle of Morals."

When Dr. Calderwood's theory as to the origin of property is abandoned, his deduction of the duty of Honesty from the supreme principle under which he endeavors to bring it, fails.

9. Apart from this, the alleged supreme principle is too indefinite to serve as the starting point of any such deduction as Dr. Calderwood attempts. When it is said to be right to use our powers for their rational ends, or for their nat-

ural ends, what is meant by rational or natural ends?

10. If the meaning be, those ends to which our powers *ought* to be directed, then the proposition; it is right to use our powers for rational ends, or for their natural ends, is reduced to this, it is right to use our powers for the ends for which it is right to use them.

11. If the phrase "rational" or "natural ends" means anything else than the ends to which our powers ought to be directed, one would need to be informed of what *is* meant; before he can make any use of Dr. Calderwood's supreme principle or deduce any subordinate principle from it. No such information, however, is given by Dr. Calderwood.

OBJECTIONS TO DR. CALDERWOOD'S DOCTRINE OF INTUITIVE MORAL PRINCIPLES.

1. If moral principles were intuitively apprehended, the ideas involved in the principles would need to be perfectly definite. But, on the contrary, the ideas involved in many of the ordinarily accepted principles are exceedingly indefinite. What is Truth? What is Purity?

3. If moral principles were intuitively apprehended they would be valid absolutely and without exception. But there are at least some of the ordinarily accepted moral principles that seem to admit of exceptions in extreme cases.

2. If moral principles were intuitively apprehended they would be universally accepted. As a matter of fact, there is scarcely one moral principle that is universally accepted. (Love your enemies.—Forgiveness of injuries.)

4. Not a few of the ordinarily accepted moral principles depend on conceptions of such a character as to show that the principles are not ultimate.

5. Those who are of opinion that certain moral principles are intuitively apprehended by the moral faculty seem to be under obligation to meet Locke's demand and show what they are. This has never been done in a satisfactory manner.

REMARKS ON KANT'S ETHICS.

Kant asserts that there is a moral law for man as a rational being, a law of conduct, so that in any given circumstances it would be right to act in one way, wrong to act in another. This is in accordance with the old Stoic idea of law as something distinguished from the mere drawing of inclinations and when we think that one end is better or worse than another the law asserts that we ought to follow the better, avoid the worse. Kant regards this law as a "pure idea of reason." What does this mean? It might be contrasted with the view of J. S. Mill, that identifies conscience with "a feeling in our own mind; a pain more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which, in properly cultivated moral natures, rises in the more serious cases into shrinking from it as an impossibility." (Mill, *Utilitarianism*, Chap. 3.)

But I agree with Kant in not making conscience an emotional state, a feeling of liking or aversion, but rather a mode of "practical thought," impossible to be realized, I grant, except in connection with empirical instigations towards particular ends, yet, nevertheless, radically distinct from all such inclination.

I also agree with Kant in asserting that the idea or consciousness of right and wrong and duty is a fact. No fact can be proved. I, the

rational being, whom I call myself think certain courses of conduct to be right, as compared with others, and certain courses of conduct to be wrong as compared with others, and it is my duty to do the first and not to do the second. I do not refer to animal instinctive impulses, but to a mode of thinking which I find myself exercising. I agree with Kant, "two things fill me with admiration, the starry heaven above, the moral law within" and I connect both immediately with the consciousness of my own existence.

To this fundamental position of Kant it is no valid objection to say that one man's moral conduct differs from another man's. This would be a fatal objection to the intuitional theory as held by Dr. Calderwood.

Kant asserts that there is such a thing as a thought of duty. The particular course of conduct to which this may be applied may not be determinately apprehended, and in this matter one man's idea may be different from that of another; and the same man may have different ideas at different times.

Nevertheless the idea of a moral law as a "Categorical imperative" is in all men who may be said to be moral beings.

With Kant I deny that the empirical instigations or inclinations are the sole determinants of the will as the experientialists hold. For instance Hobbes who makes Volition the last desire followed by action, that is, by organic

movement, the last aversion followed by the omission of a movement and Bain gives a similar account of the matter. I regard this experimental doctrine as incorrect. I am convinced that we have a conviction of duty. This thought of duty is not an abstractly pure form, we really think what the words, right, obligatory, mean by applying them to particular cases. We must think some definite lines of action as higher or lower than others, and such practical thought is not a sense impulse at all. Furthermore we must admit that the presence of some empirical end is necessary as an indispensable condition for the possibility of acting. Moral Action would be impossible without any definite end to be aimed at. And it may be admitted that there may be inclinations to act in a certain manner. But the will is determined not by the inclination to the empirical end but by the idea that this end is right for me to realize.

Kant, however, maintains that the objects of desire are always for pleasure. Hence Kant leaves no alternative between acting on the one hand from the pure sense of duty or on the other hand acting simply with the aim of pleasure. Now in all voluntary action the man must indeed seek his self-satisfaction but not necessarily in the attaining of pleasure. He may aim at some object or end which he considers to be desirable and this end so judged may be something quite different from pleasure. For instance, hating

an enemy and seeking his destruction. There may be an awareness that the gaining of this result would be accompanied by pleasure but it is not this pleasure that you are seeking. There may be disinterested hatred as well as disinterested affection. Green discusses this very fully in *Proleg. to Ethics* Bk. 3, Chap. 1., mainly in criticism of J. S. Mill, but in Sec. 160. the following pertinent criticism of Kant is given.—

“We are falling into a false antithesis, if having admitted (as is true) that the quest of self-satisfaction is the form of all moral activity we allow no alternative (as Kant in effect seems to allow none) between the quest for self-satisfaction in the enjoyment of pleasure and the quest for it in the fulfilment of a universal practical law. Ordinary motives fall neither under the one head nor the other.”

What does the “Categorical imperative” enjoin? On Kant’s view it is inevitable that it should be debarred from giving any particular content. Natural desires always prompt to seek the empirical end of pleasure and surely the moral law could not demand that we seek pleasure without exception. Yet the moral law does require unconditional obedience to itself, as Green interprets it, the only unconditional good is the “good will.” Green says the moral ideal is personal character; the best state of the self or individual and the best state of the individual includes an interest in other persons.

The moral law requires unconditionally the fulfilment of the self, of the rational nature of the self. Kant and Green practically identify the moral law with the command "Be ye perfect."

What constitutes perfection of personal character? This will appear more and more as reason develops and unfolds itself. Though we do not know in full we know in part so that the thought of perfection is not a vain imagination. You may obey in so far as you have definite ideas about what is required to constitute perfection. (Green. Proleg. Sec. 172).

Does Kant give any principles to assist us? He asserts that—it is an unconditional demand that "we treat humanity always as an end never as a mere means." Contrast this with the Utilitarian account.

1. You begin with desiring pleasure to yourself.
2. You note that you need help from others to gain the pleasure you desire.
3. You seek this help and form a habit so that you automatically help others. Of course always as a means to your own pleasure.

Kant says you should never treat humanity as a mere means, but always as an end. Again he asserts that you should "so act that the maxim (particular rule) of your will may be capable of being regarded as a principle of universal validity." This suggests the golden rule, "whatsoever ye would that others should do unto you, do ye even so to them."

In asserting that there are no "material" principles how far is Kant correct? If he means that no particular courses of conduct can be exhibited as unconditionally valid I would agree with him. Dr. Calderwood would dissent.

Green says there is always some condition on which "the bindingness of the rule is contingent" (Green *Prolegomena*, Sec. 196). "Never deceive your neighbor." How does this apply to the general of the army in making his campaign?

Kant seems to mean more than this. He seems to assert that the Will itself is good irrespective of the object towards which it is directed.

Green says the good will differs from the bad will in virtue of the objects willed. The good will aims at one thing e.g. the good of your neighbor, the bad will aims at something different, injury to your neighbor. What is called Kant's "purism" insists that in each moral act there must be a conscious explicit intention to fulfil the law by that act. He seems to assert a duty apart altogether from the circumstances and quite irrespectively of the consideration of the superiority of one end over another. I do not see how this can be maintained. The very fact of the good Samaritan seeking one end intrinsically higher than another constitutes the rightness of his action.

What is called Kant's "rigorism" asserts that duty always requires us to sacrifice inclination,

limiting some, quashing others, and hence duty is always painful. This is not defensible though it has in it a measure of truth. Duty often requires the sacrifice of inclination, but as the man progresses in morality, the better he becomes in character, the pain involved in the sacrifice of personal inclinations for the sake of duty becomes less and less.

Lastly, where we are quite opposed to Kant's thought, we must assert that in sacrificing the inclinations of the senses and lower nature a higher satisfaction is gained. You are as a matter of fact in willing, always seeking to satisfy your own nature, but you may gain a satisfaction which is not in its nature of the same kind as the gratification of the senses but may be termed a happiness of a higher order.

REMARKS ON EVOLUTION IN DISCUSS- ING GREEN. Prolegomena Sec. 98.

I have not a single word to say against the theory of evolution, if it is restricted to its proper limits. There is strong evidence that higher organisms have grown up slowly from lower organisms. These statements of scientific men are entitled to consideration. I think they are worthy of acceptance though the Scientists themselves hesitate to claim the theory as absolutely established. But I am willing to regard it as though it were established. At the same time however I refuse most decidedly to admit that the earliest dawn of consciousness may have arisen from the non-conscious elements.

Such a theory it seems to me is itself not in accordance with the theory of evolution but a distinct negation of it. And because I am favorably disposed to the theory of evolution I reject this account of the rise of consciousness. I also reject it for other reasons, but the evolutionist should not complain because really I am standing by his theory. And if I accepted this account I would be rejecting evolution. For what is peculiar to the evolutionary theory?

This, that it asserts that no changes take place "per saltum" in the organic world. Continuity

is the great central principle in Evolution. The organism grows up by degrees. Now if the law of continuity hold, self-consciousness cannot possibly be a result of a development from unthinking matter. Because at a certain point there would be no consciousness, then suddenly there would arise consciousness. This would be a leap from the unconscious to the conscious. It would be an absolutely new thing.

But not a new phenomenon, because consciousness itself is not a phenomenon. It is something above phenomena. To grant that self-consciousness so sprang up would be contrary to evolutionary principles. It is furthermore absurd on other grounds of a deeper character.

Material forms whether organic or inorganic can have no possible existence—at any time whatsoever—except in relation to and dependence upon self-consciousness—as Kant has demonstrated.

